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Introduction
As one of the most influential philosophers of the
twentieth century, Ludwig Wittgenstein
(1889–1951) has impacted a variety of scholarly
disciplines, including education theory and
research. Wittgenstein’s later works are often
cited for their insights into a wide variety of phil-
osophical topics, including meaning and under-
standing, rule following, the “inner” and “outer”
realms of human activity, and certainty about
knowledge. In contrast to the representationalist
view of language expressed in his earlier work,
these writings identify the meaning of an expres-
sion as its rule-governed use in language, inextri-
cably tied to its use in our lives.
Wittgenstein’s name has been invoked with
increasing regularity, especially since what might
be termed the “social turn” in research on learning
in (science) education, including interest in the role
of discursive interaction in human development
and in sociological studies of scientific practice.
Less understood but no less significant in education
research are the implications of Wittgenstein’s
vision of an alternative orientation for philosophy
and, in turn, the impact of this vision on theory and
research in the various human sciences. Wittgen-
stein claimed that frustration with psychology
should not be mistaken for problems related to its
being an underdeveloped science. Rather, he
faulted “conceptual confusions” in which pre-
scribed methods are thought to deliver solutions
to problems but instead miss the mark entirely.
Extending these Wittgensteinian points, phi-
losopher Peter Winch argued that social science
is much more conceptual than empirical and that
the proper understanding of meaningful human
action involves dialectical examination of lan-
guage use. Producing empirical evidence to sat-
isfy an essentially conceptual question – for
example, concern with identifying the “most
effective instructional method” or even “what
was learned in a laboratory exercise” – results in
begging the question, regardless of the depth of
care we take in specifying operational definitions.
Most theories that get adopted in education
# Springer Science+Business Media Singapore 2016
M.A. Peters (ed.), Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-287-532-7_40-1
research end up simply replacing the answers
given to the perpetual problems of educational
practice while leaving central analytic orienta-
tions intact; Wittgenstein’s and Winch’s notions
force us to examine whether education researchers
should instead fundamentally change the ques-
tions that are asked.
Wittgenstein’s Philosophy
Numerous summaries of Wittgenstein’s biogra-
phy and philosophical contributions exist; only
broad arguments related most directly to the
uptake of his work in science education are
given here. As outlined in Philosophical Investi-
gations (Wittgenstein 1958) and other posthu-
mously organized collections of his vast notes
and dialectical exemplars, Wittgenstein’s later
work was concerned with pointing to the
unrelieved role of grammar in philosophical puz-
zles. Wittgenstein proposed time and again that
philosophical difficulties were often the result of a
lack of clarity surrounding our concepts; certain
expressions (e.g., “to be” or “to exist”) continually
lure us into supposed philosophical crises,
whereas examining the expression’s logic in use
suggests a “therapeutic” alternative analysis and
resolution.
The analysis of the meaning of an expression
relies on examination of its ordinary use in our
lives, use that is embedded in what Wittgenstein
referred to as “language games.” A language
game is essentially a grammar of practice, rule
governed, and knowable to competent speakers
of a language. It is sometimes assumed that
philosophy’s task is to produce solutions to puz-
zles of meaning and existence, akin to the natural
sciences’ aim to produce causal explanations of
observed patterns and relationships. Again, how-
ever, for Wittgenstein, the goal of philosophy
properly conceived is to produce clarifying
descriptions of the rule-governed use of concepts
in our various language games.
One question raised by Wittgenstein’s philos-
ophy concerns the source of the aforementioned
rules: is it in fact the case that the origin of these
rules is what is in need of explanation? And if it is
not the task of philosophy to produce this expla-
nation, perhaps this is the rightful role of linguis-
tics or social science more generally? Although
some have certainly advanced this interpretation
of Wittgenstein, a more common response is to
point to his numerous references to the commonly
perceived but sorely misguided need to secure the
foundations of all knowledge. Rather than
suggesting a skeptical interpretation of his discus-
sions of rule following, Wittgensteinian philoso-
phers such as Peter Hacker (1999) and Cora
Diamond (1989) urge us to understand his writ-
ings as pointing to the way that rules exist against
a background of modes of living in and talking
about the world; rules and contexts are mutually
constitutive rather than causally emergent and in
need of explanation.
Wittgenstein’s insistence on the rule-governed
nature of our lives may also be heard as validation
of scholars who insist on the primacy of social,
rather than psychological, explanations of human
behavior. It is the case that Wittgenstein discusses
and rejects the idea of a “private language” – the
notion that an individual attaches unique names to
individual experiences, and this creates an “inner
world” known only to himself (e.g., see Hacker
1999). Typically, however, Wittgenstein should
be interpreted not as “taking sides” in a familiar
battle but as resetting the terms of the debate; in
this case, it is not so much the triumph of “social”
over “individual” worlds that is noteworthy but,
rather, the way in which the “inner-outer divide”
itself can be seen as illusory and a product of our
ways of speaking rather than a conundrum in
desperate need of resolution.
Related to this critique of the mind-body
(or more contemporary brain-body) dualism,
Wittgenstein is largely seen as having dismantled
a representationalist view of language. “Repre-
sentationalist” refers to the notion that language
ties to and names the world, such that its use is
indicative of something lying behind it; language
“stands for” or “points to” something, in the way
that announcing “I am hungry” is sometimes
thought to imply that the speaker is translating
introspection into words, orienting to her inner
condition in order to communicate with others.
Alternatively, stating “I am hungry” can be seen
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simply as a rule-governed behavior we engage in
(rather than, e.g., crying or enduring the pain of an
empty stomach). It is a subtle distinction to talk of
language as expressing rather than representing.
And of course, language can be used to represent,
or to name –Wittgenstein challenges us to see that
representing is but one use for language, not a
fundamental, singular, or universal relationship
between language and the world.
Influence in Science Education Research
In order to appreciate the influence of
Wittgenstein’s writings in science education
research, it is helpful to have a general outline of
studies of student learning in the field. While
consensus on the approach to research or even
the goal of inquiry is not readily apparent, the
overwhelming focus has been on students’ under-
standing of scientific concepts. Conceptual learn-
ing has been and is often still thought of as the
acquisition or restructuring of individual mental
representations. Increasingly, though, language
and social interaction have been viewed as critical
in shaping these mental representations; in some
cases, the notion of concept-as-mental-
representation has been called into question.
Attempts to determine the causal relevance of
other factors such as motivation, attitude, ele-
ments of individual identities, learning environ-
ments, or other “internal” or “external”
characteristics have also been undertaken.
In relation to research on students’ learning in
science, Wittgenstein’s philosophy has been
invoked in at least four broad ways over the last
several decades (Heckler 2014). Early dissenters
to the emerging “conceptual change” theory of
cognitive learning in science as analogous to
rational theory replacement in the discipline of
science argued against the plausibility of novice
students’ ability to logically justify and appropri-
ate scientifically superior counterparts to their
naïve and unworkable explanations of the world.
Wittgenstein’s writings were used to emphasize
the nonrational aspects of human interaction
(persuasion versus reason; learning by imitation
and training) or to point to multiple and local
rationalities as more relevant to the student’s task
than a universal scientific logic.
A second strand of research has enlisted Witt-
genstein in the project of theorizing student learn-
ing as a sociocultural rather than individual-
psychological process. Students’ acquisition of
scientific concepts was characterized as success-
ful participation in a scientific language game.
Most theorists argued for a picture of learning
that involved a combination of “individual” and
“social” elements, for example, appropriate lan-
guage performance as evidence of a scientific
concept correctly internalized. However, occa-
sionally Wittgenstein’s philosophy has been used
in science education to argue for rejecting the
individual-social dichotomy and any sense of a
uniquely individual cognition.
The introduction and use of the science studies
literature – broadly, sociological, historical and
philosophical inquiries into scientific practice as
it occurs in particular settings, on particular
occasions – in science education provided a third
opening for the use of Wittgenstein’s philosophy.
An interest in science studies grew out of the
sociocultural in research on science learning;
rather than imagine logical scientific theory
change as a cognitive development, investigators
studied science classrooms as sites of scientific
practice (and concept development), inspired by
methods and arguments from science studies. The
path to Wittgenstein here is somewhat indirect,
but emanates largely from the writings of David
Bloor, who as spokesperson for the “Edinburgh
Strong Programme” in science studies argued
(following Saul Kripke) that Wittgenstein’s dis-
cussion of rule following licensed a skeptical
interpretation: that if we can’t point to empirically
derived, natural causes for the rules we follow in
various forms of practice (including rules for lan-
guage use), the explanation must lie in social
consensus, the formation of which should be stud-
ied and understood theoretically. This social-
constructivist approach to explaining how stu-
dents come to understand science in classroom
settings was embraced by science education
researchers beginning in the mid-to-late 1990s.
Finally, Wittgenstein’s writings have inspired
discussion of new methodologies in researching
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students’ science learning. The most robust of
these has been known as “practical epistemology
analysis,” which involves analyzing transcripts of
science learning activities, in order to pinpoint
where students have difficulty understanding and
how that difficulty is resolved via known con-
cepts. Wittgenstein’s notion of meanings that
“stand fast” in relation to their surroundings was
combined with the notion of “family resem-
blance” across language games in order to reimag-
ine and investigate students’ acquisition of new
conceptual understanding in science. Such analy-
sis was used to describe what students learned
from various laboratory practicals and how
student-teacher interaction guided learning, to
identify metaphors as important connectors
between students’ established knowledge, and to
illustrate students’ use of aesthetic judgments in
negotiating their participation in a school science
classroom, among others.
The Problem of Scientism
Although Wittgenstein’s philosophy has been
cited in service of studying student learning in
science in various ways, the claim has been
made that ultimately these references miss the
point of his arguments (Heckler 2014). To under-
stand why, it is important to appreciate the under-
currents of anti-scientism (not antiscience) at
work in Wittgenstein’s writings. In this context,
“scientism” refers to the tendency to lift up scien-
tific methodology as the preferred (if not sole)
source of certain knowledge in all human prac-
tices. Many academic disciplines beyond the nat-
ural sciences model their modes of inquiry on the
empirical methods of the natural sciences. How-
ever, we could ask whether some endeavors – for
example, aesthetics, ethics, or philosophy more
generally – need to emulate this methodology or
whether they might rightfully pursue other
approaches to generating knowledge. In part, the
answer depends on how we think about what is
real: must the concepts covered by epistemologi-
cal or metaphysical questions be empirically
observable to count as “real?” Lyas (1999)
explains how Peter Winch draws from
Wittgenstein in examining just these questions,
asking, for example, should empirical linguistics
replace philosophy as the source of truth about our
use of concepts? Winch’s and Wittgenstein’s phi-
losophies suggest they would oppose such a con-
clusion for the study of much of human social life.
However, the prevalence of scientistic tendencies
across a vast swath of contemporary academic
work may suggest a lack of familiarity with the
argument – or perhaps, the common, scientistic
assumptions behind the current plethora of
“methods” and “theories” at play in the social
studies are concealed by their seeming differences
(Hutchinson et al. 2008).
Education research is not immune to these
pressures. In fact, the desirability of a scientific
approach to studies in education has been codified
by laws such as the Every Student Succeeds Act
(ESSA) of 2015 (which recently replaced the No
Child Left Behind Act of 2001). ESSA specifies
that educational initiatives deserving of federal
funding for implementation and further study
must be “evidence based,” defined as derived
from experimental, quasi-experimental, or corre-
lational studies that have demonstrated a statisti-
cally significant effect on student learning
outcomes or from rationales for approaches that
show promise of scientific validation.
This evidence-based orientation has affected
traditional norms of educational practice, as
well. For example, curriculum was once idealized
as an expression of values or of an educational
philosophy tied to its ultimate purpose: educating
for individual development, social efficiency,
social reform, vocational training, participation
in democratic society, social mobility, knowledge
replication and production, proof of status, trans-
mission of cultural heritage, exposing and
transgressing oppression and injustice, and so
on. But increasingly today, curriculum is seen as
necessarily tied to “models of student learning”;
the curriculum itself must be “evidence based.” In
a field where research traditions have been sum-
marized as possessing “no rules that everyone
follows, no beliefs that everyone shares, no find-
ings that everyone agrees on” (Anderson 2007,
p. 3), the assumption that research should set
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curricular policy might reasonably be called into
question.
Wittgenstein spoke against the analytic ten-
dency to reduce our human understanding of the
world to universal concepts and causal
relationships – what he called a “craving for gen-
erality.” But the overwhelming imperative in con-
temporary education research is indeed to satisfy
such a craving. To suggest otherwise invites
charges ranging from naiveté to professional
incompetence. With occasional exceptions, the
use of Wittgenstein’s philosophy in science educa-
tion has not been to call for an alternative analytical
orientation but, rather, to appropriate singular con-
cepts or notions in service of the familiar ways of
seeking to provide explanation for students’ learn-
ing (or lack thereof) in educational settings. “Lan-
guage games,” “standing fast,” “family
resemblance,” and other Wittgensteinian notions
have been used to provide new ways of character-
izing students’ learning in science, when what is
needed instead is an inquiry into whether it makes
sense to investigate learning as a process or a causal
phenomenon in the first place.
Wittgensteinian Alternatives
for Educational Inquiry
Peter Winch, in drawing upon and extending
Wittgenstein’s philosophy in his book, The Idea
of Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy
(Winch 1990), argued that the study of people is
more akin to philosophical than to natural scien-
tific inquiry. One way to summarize it might be
this: philosophy (e.g., epistemology) is funda-
mentally concerned with the nature of human
social life but not empirically so. Empirical
study (in Winch’s sense) reveals something new
about the world and in particular about (causal)
relationships between objects. But philosophy’s
interest is in conceptual truths – or how our con-
cepts are related to the world – and typically, this
is not new information but information that any
competent user of a language knows and can
recognize (Lyas 1999). Philosophers remind us
of the various ways that concepts are used mean-
ingfully in our lives (Diamond 1989).
To say that the study of social life is more often
conceptual than empirical is to assert that such
study takes interest in meaningful behavior, and
following Wittgenstein, meaningful behavior is
rule-governed behavior, dependent on occasion
and purpose. We expose and uncover social con-
cepts and relationships by examining what we
know about our rule-governed forms of life.
Empirical investigation, on the other hand,
depends on settling the criteria of what is to be
observed. When social concepts are
operationalized in order to perform experimental
investigations of them, we can give the illusion of
discovering new information or of exposing
causal generalizations. But the act of operatio-
nalizing concepts in order to observe human inter-
action often masks myriad ways that rules are
meaningfully followed and the choices people
have in social life. Empirical analysis ends up
begging philosophical questions about the
occasion- and purpose-bound use of concepts in
our lives (Hutchinson et al. 2008).
What might conceptual analysis look like in
education research? One example is given in
Francis (2005); this critique of radical and social
constructivism relies on insights from both Witt-
genstein and Winch, as well as analysis of the
logic inherent in von Glasersfeld’s “radical con-
structivism” and Bloor’s “social constructivism”
to illustrate the nonsensical elements of these
research agendas. Francis observes that both the-
ories are essentially philosophical arguments
purporting to be empirical research programs.
Similar critiques might be undertaken of the var-
ious theoretical traditions existing in science edu-
cation research today.
A different approach, no less informed byWitt-
gensteinian philosophy, guides Macbeth’s (2000)
analysis of a recorded interview between a young
student and a conceptual change researcher.
Rather than using the analysis to suggest new
theoretical understandings of science learning,
Macbeth essentially exposes the logic of alternate
“language games” at play during the interaction
and foregrounds the way in which the professional
analytic practice of a “diagnostic interview” both
relies on and simultaneously disavows the stu-
dent’s everyday orientation to questions and
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answers in order to ascribe to her various levels of
conceptual (mis)understanding.
The difficulty of resisting the urge to theorize,
of ignoring the weight of expectations to produce
causal explanations of students’ learning, or of
eschewing the idea that social study should aspire
to anything like prediction or control of interac-
tional outcomes should not be underestimated.
But the promise of clear and penetrating descrip-
tions of education as rule-governed practice and
of useful insights into our understanding of mean-
ingful behavior will perhaps ultimately inspire
fidelity to Wittgensteinian perspectives in
researchers’ future analytic undertakings.
References
Anderson, C. W. (2007). Perspectives on science learning.
In S. K. Abell & N. G. Lederman (Eds.), Handbook of
research on science education (pp. 3–30). New York:
Routledge.
Diamond, C. (1989). Rules: Looking in the right place. In
D. Z. Phillips & P. Winch (Eds.), Wittgenstein: Atten-
tion to particulars. Essays in honor of Rush Rhees
(1905–1989) (pp. 12–34). London: Macmillan.
Francis, D. (2005). Using Wittgenstein to respecify con-
structivism. Human Studies, 28, 251–290.
Hacker, P. M. S. (1999). Wittgenstein: On human nature.
New York: Routledge.
Heckler, W. S. (2014). Research on student learning in
science: A Wittgensteinian perspective. In
M. R. Matthews (Ed.), International handbook of
research in history, philosophy and science teaching
(pp. 1381–1410). Dordrecht: Springer.
Hutchinson, P., Read, R., & Sharrock, W. (2008). There is
no such thing as a social science: In defence of Peter
Winch. Burlington: Ashgate.
Lyas, C. (1999). Peter Winch. New York: Routledge.
Macbeth, D. (2000). On an actual apparatus for conceptual
change. Science Education, 84(2), 228–264.
Winch, P. (1990). The idea of a social science and its
relation to philosophy (2nd ed.). London: Routledge.
Wittgenstein, L. (1958). Philosophical investigations
(trans: Anscombe, G. E. M.). Engelwood Cliffs: Pren-
tice Hall.
6 Wittgensteinian Perspectives and Science Education Research
